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Marianne Garneau, publisher of Organizing.Work, joins the show to discuss her article Workplace Struggles Are Political.


Garneau's provides a necessary corrective over common views amongst "socialists" that work and politics are two separate spheres in which struggle takes place. Following the wrongheaded opinion of Lenin, who assessed workers as only capable of rising to a level of "trade union consciousness," these socialists, according to Garneau, "take a surprisingly apolitical view of what goes on in the workplace."


Read the article that informs the conversation: https://organizing.work/2021/07/workplace-struggles-are-political/


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Laborwave Radio: Marianne Garneau now welcome back to labor wave radio. 

Marianne Garneau: Thanks for having me again. 

LR: I was really excited to read one of your most recent pieces on organizing work. Workplace struggles are political because I think it really like I've been getting increasingly angrier as I've become more and more aware of how little confidence and faith. It seems like a lot of like labor lefties have in the capacity of ordinary workers to both organize their own unions, but also act politically. And I don't know like how to express it properly, but it's just something I keep noticing and noticing. 

And I think this piece really just laid it down and made it crystal clear what's going on. So you immediately begin by illustrating how for many on the labor laughed or self-described socialist. They think of the economic arena and the political arena as separate spheres is very distinct. So could you just explain a little bit more about that separation and why it leads to a lot of problems when it comes to thinking about politics and labor organizing? 

Speaker 2 (3m 32s): Yeah, I mean, I think there are basically two trends that go hand in hand. One is thinking that, you know, unions are important. We should organize workers. Obviously the workplace matters. That's where we earn a wage. There's some sense that there's a power struggle there, workers need benefits, whatever. And so, okay. Yeah, we need unions. We need unions to push back against employers, but there's this really prevalent thought that the real political work or thinking or action or power struggle takes place outside of work. 

So the idea is that like we need workers in unions because workers need to be organized within the real political work is going to be done by intellectuals and luminaries. And most importantly, a political party and real political fights take place in this sort of official political sphere where we fight over elected positions and put forward competing visions of society and so on and so forth. So what's really weird about that is in the first place, the fact that it completely tracks the kind of what we might call the Borzois mentality, which prevails in our society, which is that work is one thing and politics is another right. 

Politics is something we do at election time in those contested spaces for, you know, public office, whatever work is not that important, right? In fact, contemporary society wants you to think of quality of work is not political at all. You're not supposed to think there's anything strange about the fact that all orders come from the top down and about the fact that if you are insubordinate to your employer, you will find yourself on the street. Like we're not supposed to spend much time thinking about that at all. 

We're not supposed to see Paula work is political. We're not supposed to spend too much time thinking about that as a power struggle as a location of like opposing class interest and so on and so forth. So there's this weird way in which leftists replicate that by thinking that, okay, yeah, we should, we should have better wages. We should organize for Christian to unions. And they even use the words, class struggle around that, but they really think that real real politics takes place somewhere else. The other thing that that goes hand in hand with which I tried to address both in this piece that I wrote is thinking that workers need outside leadership. 

And that thought occurs on a lot of different levels. So it occurs in the form of thinking that like unions are okay, but they're very limited. They can't come up with their own political vision. What happens there is not terribly forward or far thinking they need political parties instead, or it happens as you were alluding to in the form of thinking that, you know, workers are great. We love workers, right? Workers are there, the proletariat, we love the workers, but they can't think for themselves, they need leaders. 

They need a party. They need intellectuals to actually do the thinking for them, whatever, even manifests in terms of like how the organizing takes place, where you either think that you need outside staff to come in and completely run a campaign and do things and strategize and vision eyes or whatever on behalf of workers, or you think you can do that, that they could do that themselves. And there were very, very, very few people in the latter camp. Like it's like, you're saying, once you see it, you can't unsee it. But the lack of confidence in working people's ability to actually a run their own campaigns, be developed politically, see, be the people who are pushing back against capitalist power in our society. 

Like there is no confidence in that. And once you see that you cannot see, 

Speaker 0 (7m 7s): And you even point out that when people do say like, when there is a concession made from like this labor left, that workers are capable of any type of organizing, they always frame it as being a spontaneous struggle, that it can never be premeditated, that it can only be the result of accidents, I suppose. 

Speaker 2 (7m 26s): Absolutely. Like, that's the straw man. Right? And so my article takes on a couple of pieces. One is by this guy named Sam Kendon, who's in Canada. I think like basically a Trotskyist. I don't really pay attention to people's like, I don't, I honestly don't care. It's hard to tell, like, this is probably very obvious, but I genuinely don't care. I know he's worked for the, the KT auto workers back when it was called that he was a university professor and so on and so forth, but he's a socialist basically. Right? So he was writing about how it's foolish to think that you don't need leadership because workers are not spontaneously radical. 

And whenever somebody uses the word spontaneity, like reach for your wallet or your gun, whatever, whatever the appropriate expression is in this case, like who the fuck is arguing, that workers are spontaneously radical, that they spontaneously, I don't know, spout, leftist, Marxists ideals that they spontaneously rise up at work. And in fact, there's a weird debate that plays out between the Trotskyist or Leninist socialists who believe in leadership from above, and then like the contrarion ultra left communists who think, no, no, no, there's no leadership necessary because these things will happen spontaneously. 

And I basically think both of those positions are wrong. And I think that that's why the website organizing work confuses people because we basically believe that working people should, can and should absolutely lead their own struggles. But of course there's a process of development. That's going to take place in that. And a lot of what that development looks like is just going up against the boss collectively and then realizing what a power struggle that is shoring up your power and doing it again, stronger, better, et cetera. 

But at no point in that process, do I see some fundamental need for like, you know, the, the socialist visionary to parachute in and start? Like, I don't know. He, there's also just a weird understanding of like what, what even is political 

Speaker 0 (9m 26s): And why and why people are willing to take actions on the shop floor. Like there's a weird conviction that only if people have the proper ideas, if they have the proper political consciousness that then they will then act upon that consciousness. And I find that there is, I don't know where that started. It seems like maybe when in the one that kind of put that down first by saying workers only capable of forming trade union consciousness and nothing about that. Don't no. What do you think about this? There seems to be this like strange backward conviction that like ideas are prior to action or the ideas of the reason that people are willing to fight them. 

Speaker 2 (10m 4s): Absolutely. Absolutely. So I think that there's a sense in which that's kind of like the whole Jacobin project where you spread socialism to the masses. This is why people were also really confident that the Bernie Sanders campaign was creating a movement as opposed to just being an electoral campaign. Right? So you spread the idea of socialism to as broadly as possible that then prepares the ground for workers to actually be interested in unions or interested in organizing, which is absolutely bananas because, you know, I wrote that earlier piece called the deadbeat leftists pointing out that just, just empirically, if you talk to organizers from experience, the people who were already the diehard and committed leftists tend to actually flake out on an organizing campaign, or at least they certainly cannot be relied upon to actually step up to site a card, to come to a meeting, to take an action, you know, and so on. 

Whereas the people who you would least expect sometimes are the ones who step forward and become the most militant, the bottom line being debt. It's not as though people first get ideologically convinced to leftist ideals or socialism or unions, and then they start taking action on that basis. Workers take action because they're reasonably sure that their coworker next to them is also going to act and have their back and walk at the same time. So we do have this very backward idea of like, yeah, like we're radicalism comes from, 

Speaker 0 (11m 32s): Right. And it's not like, so from the piece and from all the work, the articles that organizing.work puts out, it's not to suggest that ideas don't matter. But I think what you're putting forward is that the experience of work, the experience of struggling together is where knowledge flows from like the ideas and the practice or together the process of political activity and political activation. Am I wrong? And like posing that this is kind of the philosophy behind these articles. 

Speaker 2 (12m 2s): I think that's a good summation. And I think it's also basically what Mark's thought. Like Marx thought that he had a pejorative term for thinking that ideas were the driver of things. He called that ideology, right? It usually the way that people think that he used that term is completely mistaken. What he meant by ideology. He was criticizing other leftists of his period where people who thought that you come up with the right ideas and then society somehow falls into, into form behind those good right ideas. 

That's the position that Mark's criticized. That's why he was a materialist. He thought you had to change material conditions in order for society to actually evolve. And it's weird how that's now completely been lost now, you know, how much does it matter what Marx himself thought it doesn't necessarily, but I'm just clowning on the people who are getting it wrong. 

Speaker 0 (12m 52s): These are the people that say they're socialists. So you would think that they would take it's more serious. 

Speaker 2 (12m 57s): I am constantly I'm bowled over by how self-described socialists are not materialists. Like they think that you need the right elixir of ideas and opinions and, and then change follows from that. And I find that insane. Like there's an actual power struggle that we are basically all ensnared in and it's centered around the production or reproduction of society and who owns what and who is allowed to command other people to work. 

And the notion that what we have to do is like ideologically drive things forward first. I just, it blows my mind that so many socialists just are not materialists. And it's not to say that, like the only struggle that exists in the workplace, because there are some very well worn debate that I am kind of stepping into, but also trying not to step into with a piece about how workplace struggles are political centralism versus, you know, socialism or whatever. The point is just that there is a particular power struggle that is taken. 

Speaker 0 (14m 3s): What's interesting too, that you, right. When the socialists do take a material analysis of reality, the conclusion they come to is that the workplace is so exploitative and so oppressive that workers are incapable of organizing because they're so beaten down. Right. So this is another justification for just propping up their own kind of intellectual vanguardism. Yeah, exactly. How, how did, how did we get here? I guess this is kind of the question, like what, what happened to start allowing these ideas to really gain traction and it'd be so commonplace amongst socialist. 

Speaker 2 (14m 37s): I mean, I think that it's two things. One is that it's actually liberal individualism in another form. So once you start thinking that like ideas are the important thing and that you individually convert, people's like hearts and minds and, you know, that's your vision of politics. That's just basically the liberal individual, his premise, you know, of the democracies that we live in taken over and adopted by socialists. I think the other place that this comes from this sort of like magical thinking and lack of concrete, strategic thinking comes from is basically a position of powerlessness. 

The less specifically confident you are, of what you were capable of and aware you are of what you are capable of, what power you have, how much you have the capacity to exercise it, the more you start drifting into magical thinking, right? And that's when you see people start talking about things like swings and historical shifts and spontaneity and movements that come out of nowhere and times changing and ideas with when they, they have given up on the idea or afraid to measure the actual power that they have. 

Speaker 0 (15m 46s): I was reading your piece. I was pondering that question as I was reading it about like, how, how did we get here? Why is this so popular amongst socialists? At one thing that I just was trying to think of, and that I wanted to hear your thoughts on is there's a possibility that the union kind of bureaucratization of the labor movement itself, like the conservative business union model, gaining traction, becoming dominant has kind of enabled this position to take root. And I'm saying that because it seems to me like a lot of the people that propose these ways of thinking that workers are incapable of organizing their own unions. 

Everything has to be top down. And then even if you have a union of workers, you still have to outsource the politics to professionals for in political parties and so on is they seem to be the people that are usually staff positions or union official dumb. They're very detached from the workplace itself. And I wonder how much this is like a phenomenological experience of them being detached from the workplace and trying to figure out justifications for how they have any influencing role in a movement. Does that make any sense? 

That question? 

Speaker 2 (16m 54s): Yeah. I mean, I'm going to just galaxy brain along with cause so one of the things I also point out, I think quickly in that piece, and there's a hyperlink to a, another article from like a year or two ago that went way more in depth is there's this weird aspect or irony to the rank and file strategy. So the rank and file strategy, which you see in things like labor nodes and elsewhere is, and it's very popular amongst socialists. And it's basically socialists saying, well, what if he didn't just forsake unions and call them limited and, and consigned to reform as a men accommodating workers to capitalism, or what if instead, we actually took union seriously and tried to use them to the fullest extent possible. 

And the ironic thing about it is that on the one hand, it has this critique that unions are bureaucratized and calcified institutions that no longer really serve workers and let's take them all over. And so there's this lack of critique of why they became bureaucratized. And the story usually goes, and you see this all over the labor left that the wrong people got to be in charge, right? 1947 or 48 or whatever, Taft Hartley, we kicked out all the communists. 

We kicked out of the socialists and with, with that went any radicalism. And then we had people in charge who were inspired by communist and socialist ideals. And that's why the unions became bureaucratized. And that's why they are the way that they are. And if we want them to act more like working class fighting organizations, we have to put the right inspired leadership back in charge, but have exactly the same structures have exactly the same machinery. And I'm coming at this from a completely different position saying that the problem was not that we kicked out the socialist per se, the problems that were we, we replaced one kind of unionism, or maybe let's say many different kinds of unions unionism with one monolithic hegemonic, kind of like monocrop of unionism, which looks like you bargain a contract that has a duration of a couple of years. 

Grievances are settled through a procedure that ultimately ends in binding arbitration strikes take place after the contract has expired strikes, are these all out affairs that are led by the union bureaucracy? Because they're the ones with the keys to the coffers. We can't have workers taking action, Willy nilly, cause that would bankrupt us as a union. We need a stable union leadership. We need decisions to be, you know, somewhat centralized all of that. Now some of that was the state and legal system with, you know, businesses backing intelligently pushing unions into a corner. 

But some of it was also just, again, you know, there, the, the labor movement has always been many different things and has always had different forms. Some of that was just one particular form being allowed to win out out of all the other forms by the legal system, by the state. And it's a very boring and docile form of unionism that doesn't wield a tremendous amount of power going on strike after the collective Bart, the collective agreement has expired when the employer can anticipate it and can train management for years to take over your jobs and can legally hire scabs and can legally permanently replace you. 

Like, that's just not that powerful of a tactic. There are other forms of unionism that used to exist that were much more direct, much more disruptive, much more basically work her led ground up much more. I don't want to say spontaneous in the sense that they came out of nowhere, but much more taking action, more frequently, as opposed to very carefully orchestrated large strikes. You know, there were forms of unionism that were much more disruptive than the one we have today. And what I don't understand about the rank and file strategy is the idea that you take somebody who has socialist inspiration in their head, and then you put them in charge of that same bureaucratic grievance and bargaining procedure. 

And suddenly you have something different. Why 

Speaker 0 (21m 4s): I don't have the answer. 

Speaker 2 (21m 5s): The answer is you don't. I mean, like here's the thing. And, and I th the arguments that I end up getting in people, which, you know, there's truth to the fact that there are some unions who do as little as possible seemingly for their members who don't take on grievances, who don't really fight at contract negotiation time, who never go on strike, who don't mobilize their own membership, who don't really do crap. And kind of like, if anything, you know, like act as a sort of third party, bureaucratic HR type entity standing between workers and their bosses. 

Fine. That's true. And then there are other unions who are still very much within the national labor relations board and all B mold, which have a much more active membership in both posture. That's true on formal levels, people point to Chicago teacher's union, for example, that's true. There are differences between different what we may call business unions and LRB unions. That's absolutely granted. However, the people that I am writing this piece at are people who are concerned as most on the labor left are with rebuilding the labor movement. 

Like holy crap, we've been on the back foot for 70 years or something. At this point we need to build back up. We need to stop losing members, losing strikes, you know, seeing the real contents of our collective agreements eroded, you know, signing two tier contracts, losing fights, you know, and so on, right. We need to build back a fighting labor movement, but the vision for building back the fighting labor movement is still coloring within lines that I think are basically like fatally going to chuckle the mixing my metaphors, but like Pam string, the labor movement 

Speaker 0 (22m 53s): To that point, often the conclusion like the immediate strategy for these folks is not to change the machinery. Like you're talking about not to like build unions in a different model, but to simply tweak and reform labor law. And so still participate in the political arena only in so far as you try to make labor law friendlier to unionization. So there's still this kind of like trap the political imagination, even amongst people that foreground ideology so much in their conception of how you revitalize. 

Speaker 2 (23m 27s): No, absolutely. And that brings us back full circle to politics, right? So the idea is you have to elect the right sympathetic politicians and then those rights sympathetic politicians will change the laws. And then once the laws are changed in your favor, then you can actually start organizing and building class power back and a piece I've published even more recently than the one about workplace struggles, being political is called there ought to be a law. And it's just basically looking at the law and what purpose it really serves. And we tend to think that, that it serves the purpose that it's pretending to serve like, oh, we have a national labor relations extra that people can unionize. 

But in reality, what it is, is kind of solidifying a compromise to tamp down on some previous disruption and to basically prevent further progress. And that piece was primarily written by philosophy of law professor. I have co-authorship because I have a couple of sentences in there too, but really the brain was the brain child that were philosophy of law professor. Who's not even particularly working in, not working in the field of labor law, but I saw her articulate this position. 

I was like, I need you to write that down because you know, people need to be convinced of this point that this is what the law does. This is what the law has always done, which is that it's basically attempting to stabilize things and stabilize things in favor of the powerful. 

Speaker 0 (24m 52s): Yeah. Right. Cause if you understand it that way, if you look at it that way, even that narrative like you were talking about before, where people point to Taft Hartley as the regressive law that expelled communists and socialists and allowed unions to become conservative. Well, if you look at the law from the perspective that you're looking at it, that it actually captures concessions and tries to make Placid, you know, insurgencies that are happening, you would look at the NRA completely differently. The Wagner act is actually a much earlier moment in time when big concessions were being made amongst unions and capital. 

Speaker 2 (25m 28s): Yeah. And it just gave birth to the kind of unionism that I am broadly critiquing here, which is a unionism in which there is a kind of the fiction of a rational exchange of ideas between employers and workers. Arbitrated by, in the end, the state that's anybody who's been, who've gone up against an employer, knows that you're not involved in irrational exchange of ideas. You're involved in a power struggle. And I feel like what the labor relations act did in general was basically try to take most of the power struggle out of the equation and tame and rationalize that process pretend that it was more of an exchange. 

And I mean, you can see the same process happening in many countries. And in many contexts, it seems to me, and I'm not a historian. I'm not going to pretend like I can fully document this point right now. But the process seems to be that you saw kind of the table legs out from underneath worker power and sometimes an exchange for huge concessions in terms of things like wealth, basically. And then once the, the legs have been sufficiently compromised, you kick table over and people always sit up and take notice when the table gets kicked over, which like maybe that was Taft Hartley. 

Maybe it was like PATCO. Maybe it was, you know, right now, whatever, but they don't really notice or pay attention to when the song of the table lakes happens. And it's like, no, that's the problem. 

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Speaker 0 (28m 1s): On the subject of the workplace being political. One thing that I really appreciate about your piece is how you point out I'm going to quote from it that the workplace is where the power struggle between the working class and employing class plays out. I've often said this, as you know, just in conversation that work is at the center of capitalism. Therefore it is a political contest station, forming unions battling over work. But I just want to hear more about your thoughts on that because you also end the article with a whole bullet list of all the ways that work is political. 

And these are the questions that we need to be paying attention to when recognizing that's worth it is political. 

Speaker 2 (28m 41s): Yeah. And it feels weird to even have to say that work is at the center of capitalism. Like, again, this, this goes back to what we were describing, where there's this abstraction of politics is only taking place in like the properly designated big P politics sphere. But if you are, for example, a socialist and you think that that the major organization of our society is in that some people own basically society or what it needs to survive and others don't. 

Then of course, that's political, that's the organizing power struggle. And other things relate to that again, not to say that there's no other power struggles in society. Of course there are other power struggles in society. The idea behind the piece was to point out that when workers are, for example, trying to take power away from their employer and empower themselves because that's a zero sum equation, right there, that's political. That is a power struggle. And that has to do with the share of power in a microcosm, the working class and the owning class in that particular instance and how much those workers are going to be able to secure is going to depend on how much power they have relative to their employer. 

That's not to say that that's not bound by a broader context. So for example, if you organized one Amazon, you can't make it wages $50 an hour because there are other logistics companies, there are other Amazon warehouses for that matter, you can't simply, you're not bargaining in a vacuum kind of thing, but all of those broader contexts are still a matter of how much power the working class has to deploy where it really counts and where it really counts. As far as the capitalist class is concerned is in the workplace. That's where their profits derived from. 

I always tell workers in an organizing campaign to think from the perspective of their boss, because it's so clarifying in terms of what it is you have to do, what's actually going to impact them, whatever, but it's worth doing that in this instance with respect to, let's say the owning class, the business class in general, think from their perspective, how much do they really seem to give a shit about electoral politics? Like some, but also like not that much, you know, like they're not like desperately hoping that Biden defeats Sanders or that like Trump defeats Biden, like they know that they're going to get their facts scratched either way, right. 

To try to respond to your question a bit more directly. Yeah. I have that bullet list at the end of things. And I think that generally get overlooked as having political significance, but that I do think have tremendous political significance in the workplace. Like for example, the difference between formal recognition as a government mediated process, that happens in the case of, for example, a secret back ballot, NLRB election versus the meaningful recognition that a group of workers gets from an employer when they have the ability to really disrupt their business or whether or not workers are required to take grievances to an arbitration process, or sorry to a process that takes place off of the workforce and ultimately ends in arbitration or whether they can address grievances. 

And sometimes workers are very serious grievances, obviously things like health and safety, things like the pace of work, things like working conditions, whether they have the ability to address those directly on the floor. That's something that a lot of the labor left isn't really seemingly that interested in, right. They're interested in who's elected to an in-charge of unions, but not like the nature of grievance settlements. Like there's so much that we've just started taking for granted. 

Speaker 0 (32m 19s): So like the first bullet about like recognition, it is totally taken for granted that the only way to gain recognition is through a formal process, through a formal written process, through the NLRB, like it is hardly ever entertained the concept. Like you pointed out that workers can actually rest recognition from their employer through direct action. If they don't have to go through the NLRB process. I even think there is like a big stark difference between the perspectives of the labor will act and what you're putting for. 

Speaker 2 (32m 49s): Yeah. I mean, in the U S you can strike for recognition, for example. And in fact, that was one of the ways that the IWW, like in the last couple of decades tried to distinguish itself from other unions was they would always strike for recognition rather than filing for an election. Although, again, if you're what you're, if what you're trying to secure is some kind of formal recognition, then I'm not sure that like, that's still very different than your ability to rest concessions. 

And like in the Stardust campaign that I worked on, one of my favorite moments was the employer actually filed a petition to try to force them to have an election. And they quashed it, even though they would have won it. Cause they were just like, this is what we're doing here. You know? 

Speaker 0 (33m 33s): So the employers do absolutely know how the workplace has political and how labor law benefits them if they can funnel workers through that process. 

Speaker 2 (33m 41s): Oh, absolutely. Like that is what again, notice their actions and notice what they care about. And one thing that I've noticed is how there's a tremendous stock put in public campaigns and public embarrassment campaigns. And this has become a tactic that's, that's almost to ink almost can't find a union that doesn't do this at this point. So you try to publicly embarrass the employer, whether it's private sector, employer, public sector, employer, and that's just become a routine part of most unions repertoires. 

Right. And notice what the employer does when you drag the employer through the mud publicly, they don't generally respond in public. Like they do have PR teams and they do have the ability to write through and press releases and they will, they have their own boiler plate. Like this just happened with the times and the tech workers at the times who were trying to organize where the newspaper or the employer said, what employers always say, which is like, Hey, we're just trying to, we're just trying to talk. We're trying to go Shate. And instead of negotiating, you know, these yahoos are out trying to screw around or whatever, right. 

The employer always says they want to talk. So it's not the, that employers don't have their own PR strategies, but if you have a picket or a rally or a press release, or you try to drag an employer's name through the mud, would they turn around and do is have a captive audience meeting, right? Like they don't sit around and then, oh shit, let's write the best tweet to repudiate this terror. You know, they just, they, they know where the power struggle actually takes place. They sit around turn, turn around and talk to their own employees to try to defeat the boat, defeat the contract, whatever. 

Speaker 0 (35m 20s): Absolutely. I mean, I guess recently we saw Amazon and Bessemer. They had a very public high-profile union effort. And there were moments where CEOs since are the higher ranking officers of Amazon were on Twitter saying pretty ridiculous stuff. But I think that actually proves the point more that they don't give a shit about their public reputation for their public image. And Amazon clearly did not care that like players, unions, all these celebrities and stuff were saying, yay workers and Amazon vote for your union. They didn't give a damn about that happening. 

Speaker 2 (35m 52s): Absolutely not. And they don't also the only thing they don't give a damn about, which is really instructive. And I published a piece on this one is ULPs they don't give a shit. If they get a ULP, like please, who cares? They're relatively easy to fight. And you know, they don't have a tremendous success rate, but even when they do the penalties are so ridiculous, employers don't really care that much about ULPs. So what was the Barstool sports guy who said a bunch of ridiculous stuff on Twitter? Like I will never allow union or something like that. And he got taken to task for that. It's like, yeah. Who cares? So we had to take the tweet down, like who cares all that air war stuff. 

And even a lot of the legal stuff. I mean, employers, they fight to win, but they're eyes on the prize are on the workplace. 

Speaker 0 (36m 34s): Right? And again, coming back to the piece, the response typically from like a labor leftist that doesn't believe that workers are capable of organizing their own unions would be, well, this is why we need more restrictive labor laws. This is why we need penalties for ULPs and such. But I want to take the opportunity to kind of summarize the key points of the article. And it does seem at one sense, you're saying the workplace is political, but you're also saying we have to have more confidence in workers being able to organize and govern their own unions and recognize that as like the real power and muscle building of the working class. 

Speaker 2 (37m 10s): Well, look, you could legislate every worker to be in a union. Let let's go, let's go pie in the sky and say, we don't just make it easier to organize, but we make it such that like any union could point their magic union, one at a workplace and snap up a cert there. How does that actually help? Right. If you don't have a genuinely organized workforce, that's capable of inflicting pain on the employer, they're not going to get anything. They're not going to rest any concessions. They're not going to win anything. 

And not that I'm opposed to labor law that is more favorable to organizing and more favorable to unions. A lot of it's just ridiculously punitive to unions and to workers. But labor law has been shaped in such a way in Canada, for example, to make it relatively easier to organize a unit. But the trade-off is that workers are all the more constrained and hamstrung in their capacity to take action. So there's a higher union density in Canada, and there's even some of that specific provisions that labor lefters and us want like card check certification in some jurisdictions and first contract arbitration. 

And it doesn't mean the labor movement. There is any stronger, like there's no, there aren't, there are no shortcuts to the fact that you have to build worker power. 

Speaker 0 (38m 25s): Well that I want it to shift and do it like kind of a new segment on labor with where we hear organizing queries and questions from people on the ground, seeking advice, seeking some kind of like informal council of sorts. And so I wanted to hear your thoughts about something that came my way recently. It was, there's not many details about the campaign, but worker reached out, said I'm at the very beginning stages of a campaign and I'm starting to get really worried that we need to have big cash reserves for this campaign to be successful. 

What do you think about that? So, so what are you, what would you say to this person with that query? 

Speaker 2 (39m 3s): This is tough. Cause I'd be, I mean, my first question is like, well, what do you need big cash reserves for? Right. So there's surely some stuff about the situation that I'm not aware of an overlooking and, you know, welcome this person to come back with more detail to correct me on what I'm about to say. But I have found that the most powerful forms of unionism that I have witnessed have basically required no money or very little money. If you take staff out of the equation and you do have genuinely worker led campaign, then it doesn't, it doesn't take money. 

And I also find that you don't really need money to motivate people. Like I'm not saying there's no place ever for paying somebody in nominal amount in order to like take care of administrative work, but the crucial frame of a campaign in which you are just fighting for your lives, you don't need to motivate people's actions within that with money. If you do, then you have a motivational sort of deficit problem that has to do with the campaign, right. And then taking action, very intelligent, coordinated, disruptive action. 

Likewise doesn't cost any money. I mean, I think there's so much to be said for marches on the boss, low level forms of work refusal and working to rule very quick strikes things that don't involve paying someone, paying a group of workers to be on a picket line for weeks at a time. Like those things I think are in many cases, actually more worrisome to an employer, especially at the organizing stages. If you have a big walkout strike, you will all be replaced. 

I just, especially if it's relatively smaller workplace, like a hundred percent guaranteed, if you can learn how to actually wield some control over work in the workplace that I think employers don't have as much of a playbook for in response. Like if you guys are genuinely broadly, thoroughly coordinated and you have the ability to, to kind of dictate some terms as to how and when and where the work gets done again, that's tremendously powerful and it doesn't really cost anything. 

And a lot of the stuff that I see campaigns spend money on, whether it's, you know, usually staff in some form or another, so it's cons, maybe it's swag, maybe it's, you know, what have you, none of that stuff is, is as powerful as the stuff that basically comes for free. 

Speaker 0 (41m 31s): Now, just following through with this, if this worker, this person were to reach out and ask your opinion about whether or not they need to affiliate, because I think that's kind of what they were getting at too is like, do we need affiliation to have resources and big cash reserves? What, what would you say to that? 

Speaker 2 (41m 46s): I am not opposed to affiliation. Like there's a lot of critiques to be made of any existing union. Having said that they have tremendous resources at their disposal, right? So in terms of stress staff, strategic advice, legal help, you know, banners, pins, what have you like, I, I don't think I've ever counseled river, would counsel a group of workers, like definitely shunned that union that wants to help you. And there is something to be said for that. And even in the case of the IWW, which is what I primarily organized with, I tell workers, despite all its problems like that there are resources there that they want and that they want to take advantage of and that they shouldn't ignore. 

You know? So I think that going it alone is pretty risky most of the time, but I don't think that you affiliate because like, what do they say, cash reserves. I just don't think that that's like, there's, there's something funny going on there. And I just want to ask a bunch of questions basically. 

Speaker 0 (42m 40s): Yeah, yeah. I think that's right on. I think the only thing I would add too, in addition to what you're saying is that if this question is coming from, as being motivated by the concern that people are going to get fired and you're going to have to like pay their wages, you know, for the time that they're trying to get reinstated to the job or find a new job, like you're probably too far ahead of yourself already. If you're only at the beginning stages of the campaign, you're already pondering, like how are we going to pay for people when they get fired? I think you might want to flow down a little and make sure you just focus on talking to people and like doing some mapping. 

Speaker 2 (43m 15s): I do think there's something to be said for being risk averse. Like you don't want to be Roy Jenkins as in kind of like kamikaze your way into a situation, get yourself, or a bunch of people fired. In fact, I think there is, I've seen that in the IWW a lot and in a lot of organizing, especially among maybe like younger people, it's like, you're, you're creating an impression that, that what organizing is, is getting fired, you know, and I've been part of campaigns where lots of people have gotten fired and it's not a good thing. And we want to be risk averse. And I think you can be risk averse while still building a tremendous amount of power and taking a lot of really effective action. 

I also don't think you can afford to really sustain anybody once even one person, once they get fired. I mean, you can do. And I've seen again, campaigns do this, they'll do intensive, intensive fundraisers, and then it's never enough money. Even if only one or a handful of people got fired. It costs a lot of money to keep a human being alive. You know, they have rent, they have food, they have bills. They have like student loans or like kids' mouths to feeds or feed or pets to feed. We can't afford that. You can't afford that. And if that's what you, as a campaign are doing as an organizing campaign, that's trying to organize a workplace. 

Then I think that first of all, you need a strategy for basically when people do get fired, that has more to do with rebuilding power in the workplace than taking care of those who have been fired. And second, I would never want someone to approach a campaign, almost selling kind of like an insurance policy. Like, Hey, we, the union, our job is when you get fired for doing this, we're going to pay your rent or your student loans. Like that is not what organizing I think should do. 

Speaker 0 (44m 50s): Yeah, I think that's great advice. So for folks, if you have any organizing inquiries, you have questions, obstacles you run into on the campaign. You want to send them our to labor wave radio, do that labor wave news@gmail.com. Read them on the show, ask our guests for their input and their thoughts on it. And hopefully that'll help you out. Marilyn Garneau. Thanks so much for coming again on labor wave. It's always a pleasure. 

Speaker 2 (45m 14s): Thank you for having me risk averse in the sense of specifically trying to avoid a what's that what's that like meme, the guy who just like have a bunk as his way into, It's like a guy's name. I have to, you know, it's like a beam for like, just being like, let's go and then immediately getting killed, like, Okay. 

All right. So let me start over. No, it's like, it's like a game Leroy Jenkins. Okay. Okay. See, I didn't get this reference until somebody explained it to me either, but okay. People will. Okay. 


Eric Laursen, author of The Operating System: An Anarchist Theory of the Modern State, joins the show to provide a concrete analysis of the State as opposed to states and compares the modern state to an operating system.


As he explains, the State seeks to be everything. The State absorbs dissent and incorporates it into building a more expansive State. Though humans created the State, it has become nearly autonomous and now shapes our conceptions of ourselves.


How do we break away from the State? What would it look like to replace the State? These challenging questions and more in our conversation with Eric Laursen.



Send comments and questions about labor organizing to laborwavenews@gmail.com


Please support Laborwave Radio by subscribing to our patreon at patreon.com/laborwave We have gifts depending on the tier you join, and exclusive access to our archives and Discord server.


Leave us a review on Apple Podcasts, it helps our content reach new listeners.


Gabriel Winant, historian and author of The Next Shift, joins the show to discuss the decline of union power in the face of speed-ups and an expanding framework of labor relations.


Our conversation focuses on worker rebellion, the political failure alongside economic gains for organized labor in the postwar era, and the lessons we can learn from the defeat of the New Deal.


He draws attention to the period known as the "great exception," where unions experienced their high-water mark in power and organization, and problematizes some of the common claims about this era. Winant shows how the present regime of privatized healthcare was embedded in the struggle over shop floor power in the postwar United States.


Get a copy of Winant's book, The Next Shift, at https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674238091


Please support Laborwave Radio by subscribing to our patreon at patreon.com/laborwave We have gifts depending on the tier you join, and exclusive access to our archives and Discord server.


Leave us a review on Apple Podcasts, it helps our content reach new listeners.


Transcript:

Speaker 1 (1m 55s): So your book is called the next shift, and I really, really love it a lot. There's so much details in the book. It's such a rich history. It's not possible to cover everything in an hour that you cover and all the aspects that you look at in this rust belt, particularly Pittsburgh history of the steelworkers. So what I wanted to do is just focus on the story of unions, the story of working class power or lack of working class power in this period that you focus on. And I thought to start, it would be really great to hear the story about Pete DeConnick that you tell it's like kind of a quick story in the book, but I feel like so much is embedded in it in particular.


I feel like it counters in some way, this pretty typical story you hear about the capitalist class and unions, having something of a temporary labor piece. I fix somebody refers to it as the great exception where workers were treated well, high watermark of unions. And then in the eighties is when the capitalist class really said, fuck that agreement. Let's just destroy unions and go after them hardcore. So this story about Peter Honick seems to be like a great moment in time to problematize that.


So could, could you tell more


Speaker 2 (3m 6s): About him? Yeah. So he is a worker, this the story I'm glad you picked up on it is a story I often tell to kind of exemplify this early part of the book where I'm talking about the steel industry and the post-war decades, Pico Haneke, maybe Johanna, I'm not so sure how you say it. It was a worker at Duquesne works, which was one of the giant integrated steel mills outside of Pittsburgh. And, you know, to research this part of my book, I read a lot of old grievances, basically archive grievances, and you know, most of them go through a big piles of them.


And most of them have very little information, but maybe one in 10 has a whole narrative attached to it of some length. So this is one of those. And the reason I did that was because I was interested as a kind of method in the points of friction and everyday life. I figured if I could kind of identify points of friction moments when conflict erupted and just the kind of normal course of daily routine, that would be a clue for me about something structural going on.


So I found a lot of grievances in the late fifties that were in one form or another about the problem with speed up. And that's not my discovery. You know, it's been known for a long time, particularly since Jack Metzger's great book, striking steel, that the industrial conflict of the steel industry in the late fifties centered on the question of work rules. And under that the speed of production 59 steel strike was fought over that issue, which is the biggest strike in us history. So I was finding all these grievances that were in one way or another about speed up this one, basically, you know, what's happened is this guy, Pete has done something that has led to his termination and then the termination is being grieved.


So he basically, as a story is told it's from the perspective initially of the plant guard, who is like, yeah, I'm sitting in my booth at the edge of the plant. And you know, Pete comes up to me from the inside of the plant and says, give me your gun, give me your gun. I need it to kill my foreman and my gang leader. And the foreman like go back to work, man, like give me my gun. So he, you know, an hour goes by or whatever. And then again, the guy in the booth sees Pete Dohuk being dragged out of the mill.


Basically, apparently he seems kind of drunk, you know, I mean, who knows, but that's the impression that this guy has, and he has, he comes by, he kind of rents again and I'm going to get that bastard or something like that. Then an hour later, he turns up across the street in his pickup truck, visibly brandishing, a rifle and the management office, the plant office faces onto the street. They see him through the window, they call the cops come, they arrest him to take the gun, which turns out to be loaded. And you know, they terminate him.


Right. And this then leads to the grievance. And there's, I think a couple interesting things about this. Yeah. It's just a little story in some way, but a couple of distinct things about it. One, he doesn't be a fire. The union gets him reinstated, not in the job that he had had, but nonetheless, yeah, he's in the general labor pool. So he gets knocked down about Jerome's in the kind of internal workplace, but he doesn't get terminated from his job despite bringing a loaded weapon to work alone. I think just like tells us something right about, about the idea of the great exception, but we actually, what we do have to take seriously about that idea, right?


That is kind of high watermark of working class organization. Power was such that this guy didn't lose his job. You know, he's buddies or his work mates on his crew testify, you know, he's right. Our foreman is constantly writing us. He's always trying to make us do things that we can't get done. You know, he threatens us to that kind of thing. So there's a kind of operational shop floor solidarity that's in place. And that translates into a kind of larger, you know, plant level power, right in the kind of grievance committee and ultimately into an industry wide power.


So in 59, the industry steel management, which bar basically big a dozen or so firms bargain, jointly one contract with the United steel workers of America. They'd been doing this for the whole post-war period. No, that's not true, but okay. A couple of contracts and you know, they are oligopolistic. They organized basically they coordinate their prices pretty much in sync. They don't have a ton of global okay. Competition yet in the fifties. And they're increasing actually technologically stagnant in part because they don't have a lot of competition.


They haven't invested in a new kinds of steel production technology. So their productivity is slipping behind labor costs in terms of its rate of growth. And they can try to pass this onto the customer. And they do, to some extent in the form of a cost increases on steel, which mean cost increases on cars. But if you do that too much, you invoke the anger of the federal government, which is constantly trying to control inflation. And this is the constant political dynamics throughout the fifties, every field strike winds up, getting settled, basically in the oval office, it becomes a kind of issue of national concern.


Famously Harry Truman tries to nationalize the industry during the Korean war so we can control this problem. So in 59, the companies, you know, they try to solve this problem by going after work rules and in bargaining this provokes, this huge strike. And you know, again, basically the Republican administration, which for its entire area years after this point has been saying, Eisenhower's been saying again and again, and again, we can't politicize collective bargaining. The government cannot be involved in resolving strikes.


And again, and again, again, you get drawn into resolving strikes because it's so costly to the federal government and you know, the people who control it and their political agenda to have the steel industry shut down. So that's the 59 strike is ultimately resolved too, right? Is that the administrative Republican administration basically liens? I mean, I'm simplifying it, but basically leans on steel companies to give up on the work rules issue after four months of strike. So like that's at the macro level, a version of a similar story, right? Which is like, there's this structural contradiction about providing security to the working class economic security to the working class, through the mechanism of private sector, collective bargaining, right?


That that's how it's going to happen. It's fundamentally political concern. It's political project of incorporating the working class into capitalist democracy is happening through, through public supervision of private sector activity. And that plays out at the macro level at a structural level, you know, as like Nixon and Eisenhower call up U S deal and say, this is over. And it plays out at the individual level for a guy like Pete Yohanna. And, you know, I think that it's really important both to right, as I was saying earlier both to recognize what's so extraordinary about that moment of working class power and also how incredibly contradictory it is.


They can't fend off the speed-ups. They can't fend off the attacks, right. They can't, I mean, the conflict is ongoing because, and there's not a satisfactory resolution either in a moment like a strike or in like a showdown over this guy's job. It was kind of constant trench warfare leading to a kind of unstable situation for the industry as a whole over the longterm.


Speaker 1 (10m 11s): Right. And I think it also challenges that narrative around how the eighties were the moment of like real capitalist class counter offensive and reaction against working class power and unions. And that companies would have to have been bold enough to even introduce these changes in the workforce in the first place to think that they can test the union power enough to compel them to them come up to the strike. So that's another thing I just want to think about a little bit more and talk about more is like probably not a fair enough question, but how much power did unions really have in the fifties?


It seemed like they were actually like battling for inches. Were they ever really battling for yards this high watermark? How accurate is that?


Speaker 2 (10m 50s): I put the moment, the kind of hinge moment. And I'm far from alone in doing this in the immediate post-war years for like the late forties. So basically there's something kind of, I think it's fair to say indeterminate in what's going to happen with the labor movement between its recognition and legalization in the mid thirties and the end of world war II. That's a period of 10 years. That's the 10 years of the CIO has grass, right? When it emerges from nothing organizes mass production industry, really dynamically and rapidly consolidates and institutionalizes itself during world war II, increasingly under the protection of the federal government.


Generally, I don't do the protection of its allies in the democratic party in particular, and also begins to get incorporated into kind of mainstream politics through that process, the over this period of time. And this is a kind of argument that often gets made. And I think it has some truth in it. This sort of systemic threat posed by an organized working class to the American political system is diminished by the incorporation of labor as element in the liberal coalition rather than having American politics and society be structurally polarized on class lines, right?


It's instead kind of the American politics and divided by party and the kind of liberal coalition or the democratic coalition, which includes the liberals, you know, also includes labor includes Northern African-Americans, who are connected to labor includes famously Southern Dixiecrats, whose elements of the bill, you know, a business and the capitalist class. So it's kind of pluralistic system is going to emerge by the cold war. And the question is, how do you get from the kind of dynamism of the CIO, the moment of the sit-down strikes and the kind of heroic polarization of, of American society by class to this later moment when labor is kind of one interest group among many, and, you know, you could argue that happens during world war two.


You could even argue happens in late thirties. And I think there's some truth in that, but certainly after the war, right, this proposition is tested in the largest strike wave in us history, which is a 45 46 strike wave. Virtually every industry goes on strike in the year after the war ends in spring 45 or summer 45 auto steel, coal rail electrical, I mean, on and on. And, you know, in some cases like the auto strike is a somewhat kind of systemic challenge to your dimension to this and that, you know, w Walter Ruther and the auto workers are still kind of demanding input over investment decisions at this point, which you don't succeed in winning one in, I forget the number, but some incredible it's like 5% of all Americans or something like that are on strike in 1946, not workers, but Americans.


And, you know, they win a lot of really good contracts in many cases, but I think it's fair to say that politically labor is resoundingly defeated in this moment. So they have success at the economic level, but at the political level, the defeated in as much as the political controls of the economy that had been in place during world war two, all get rolled back, like for example, the office of price administration, the system, by which the federal government set prices for all kinds of goods during the war, you know, there was an effort to preserve some version of that in the post-war years, which might have helped with the problem of inflation that we were just talking about in the steel industry a decade later.


So they lose a bunch of fights like that. And most significantly they lose the fight over labor law itself, right in the form of the Taft-Hartley act, which was passed in 1947 in direct. But first the Republicans take back Congress and 46 indirect kind of reaction against the strike wave and then pass the Taft-Hartley act shortly thereafter. I think your listeners probably all know the outlines of it in the Taft-Hartley act, but, you know, severely constraining in a very various ways what labor is allowed to do.


Illegalizing various tactics that had relied upon and banning more or less from leadership communists, who had been instrumental to the construction of many unions. And in particular had been kind of the bearers of the vision of the labor movement as a transformative social force, right? Not just as a kind of voice for the workers. So they have a brand voice just like everyone else has an organized voice, but rather as a transformative social force, that vision had been nourished by the radical left. And when it came under attack in the kind of Taft-Hartley and, and McCarthyism moment and get purged and later movement get purged from the kind of what had been the popular front, that vision also has to retreat.


And with it, the idea not just to kind of labor as a transformative social force, but, you know, that's closely associated with a kind of early phase of civil rights, agitation around race and racism. It's associated with a certain kinds of, you know, avant-garde feminism that we could, we could point to. So labor becomes, I mean, again, this is a very classic story, but labor becomes kind of bureaucratized and ossified by this process, right? As it, as it is reduced to nothing more than an interest group, it's still a very effective interest group.


So long as its members have this tremendous economic leverage that they continue to have for decades more, the 59 seals strike is a good example of they're still able to deliver for their members in significant ways. But what the relationship is between delivering for your members in the UAW or the U NWA or the steel workers or whatever, what the relationship is between delivering and transforming the larger society gets a lot harder to figure out


Speaker 1 (16m 19s): Taft-Hartley and labor law. I want to hear more of your thoughts on this, because the story that you told is one that you, like you said, it's kind of well, charted repeated a lot, Taft Hartley, everybody agrees really regressive piece of labor legislation that constrained organized labor and the power of unions to really transform society writ large. But there's a challenge to that story that I'm pretty warm to that argues that the seeds of that constraint, the seeds of the labor defeat were really captured in the national labor relations act like more than a decade prior to that, because it insistent on a kind of conformity of labor unions to accept collective bargaining as the paradigm, the premise for unions existing is a contract.


And then through that helped facilitate that ossification and bureaucracy at the top because he had to figure out how to administer collective bargaining agreements, learn the, the, the grievance procedure become somewhat informal attorneys and then even have professional attorneys on retainer all the time. So that's the argument, I'm just kind of curious what you think about that, particularly as it pertains to your research on the steel industries and the rise of the healthcare industry.


Speaker 2 (17m 32s): Yeah. I mean, I think it's a really good question. I think it's, I find it a very hard question for myself to answer, you know, I think that the, that process that you just described, which I alluded to earlier, when I, I think I used the phrase, the legalization of the labor movement, you know, there's no question there's no, I think it's very difficult to resist the idea that it has a kind of conservatizing effect in the way that you just described, you know, in that comes in numerous ways, right? It comes, as you say, through the elevation of the contract act of the collective bargaining agreement as the kind of purpose for existence of the labor movement and of a union, you know, I mean, there's a certain way in which I think the NLRA is designed to mimic in important ways designed to mimic the kind of liberal civil, civil freedoms and civil rights of like citizen of American democracy in the political sphere, right?


So like you cast a vote in a secret ballot election to determine who's going to represent you that institutional setup, which is not how all countries do it, is designed to mimic an existing kind of political representation in order to kind of be swelling easily, basically. Right. That was the theory was that if we, if we extend those principles into the workplace, but this will kind of go over legally and constitutionally and maybe politically and culturally, but, you know, there's something fundamentally false about that because forming a union is not like casting the vote in a representative.


I mean, it's, you know, doing the same kind of action when you vote, we're a union informing union versus when you vote for your Senator, they're totally different, different from each other. Because when you're voting to form a union, you are voting to transform your own situation, right? You were becoming the thing that you're voting for you are an entry you, or sorry, a signatory. And in fact of the contract in a certain way, I mean, not literally, but you get, you know, your, your relationship to your employer is transformed to me. You bargain a contract.


And, you know, I think that has led to a tremendous amount of kind of institutional coherency and the labor movement. The bureaucratization has been the kind of solution that's I know on the other hand of this argument, one doesn't want to root against before motion of the CIO. I think at a basic level, you know, I mean, it's just like that did affect the transformation in the lives of millions and millions of people. And we have no idea what the alternative was. I think it's very difficult to speculate about it, nor is it totally obvious. I think that all of the kinds of possibilities of, you know, more radical unionism were already foreclosed by the shape of the Wagner act itself, as opposed to by the late forties.


I think, you know, there's a good case you can make either way. However, what w whenever you dated to, however you think it happened, right? It did happen that this kind of overall social settlement in which emerged in which to be a member of the working class who enjoyed economic security, you got it through collective bargaining Layne Wyndham's book is really good on, as she describes in collective bargaining and manufacturing, as the portal to move to working class, people had to pass to access economic security.


And this has the effect also of dividing the working class. And this is something that my book makes a lot of, right? That when you are dispersing security and social citizenship through employment, but obviously a capitalist labor market is internally differentiated on equal. Then it's going to differentiate and equalize the working class and set up potentially a tagging mystic relationships between those who are party to collective bargaining and economic security, and those who are excluded from it. So something else that Taft-Hartley does, and this is a kind of central concern of the book is clarify that healthcare is not covered.


Healthcare is exempted from labor law by the Taft-Hartley act. It's kind of an ambiguous state in the period before that, because they didn't specify in the original Wagner act. And it's a nonprofit, philanthropic undertaking at this point in time. So they don't know if it counts or not, but has hardly I clarify that health care is not covered. And what this means is that I say in the book is that the economy becomes sort of dual aligned between the kind of protected areas, which are oligopolistic the organized in terms of, you know, their power to set prices and you know, how they relate to their markets.


That's on the one hand, on the other hand markets that are much, much less concentrated and much more fragmented, often more competitive, more labor intensive, rather than capital-intensive and whose workforces are not organized, and which therefore draw on more socially marginal elements of the working class workers of color immigrants. Women depends on the sector, but that, you know, healthcare falls into that category. And between these two categories, we can think of something kind of like an unequal trade relationship between nations by the late forties collective bargaining comes to include, frankly, we call fringe benefits.


I mean, basically healthcare pensions, and in particular thinking about health insurance, what is health insurance, right? It's like a coupon for someone to take for someone's else's labor, especially in this period of time. And medicine is much less technologically and scientifically intensive while you're buying with health insurance is labor from the unprotected zone. Oh, there was a kind of structural antagonism. It becomes manifest in the form of healthcare prices between these sections of the working class. And that's something that the book then tries to develop further.


Speaker 1 (23m 7s): Going back to what you were saying about how one of the consequences of Taft-Hartley was facilitating the expulsion of communist and leftist in general, from organized labor. It really limited and constrained the vision of the labor movement made it more of a battling for inches rather than, you know, trying to change society. I find that interesting to counter it, contrast that with like the vision of the capitalist class, cause all in this story, there's a lot of moments where you kind of see the capitalist class organizing for the long-term.


It seems like they actually have a very large and penetrating vision, even thinking about how to make healthcare privatized and exclude it from the masses clearly marks to be a moment where the vision of the capitalist class was deep, but it counters the things that we usually hear conventionally is that capitalists are only interested in short-term profits. They have no vision, they can only think about tomorrow. Right. So how, how true is that? Like how organized the question really is, how organized is the capitalist class and how organized are they around like a longterm vision?


Speaker 2 (24m 14s): This is a historically variable question. And I don't think there's one answer that applies to all capital's classes and alternative places, right. But a degree of organization fluctuates, but you know, in this period, you know, I think that fractions are elements of the capitalist class. We're interested in a new deal for various reasons, or at least willing, I mean, some actively participated in it. Thomas Ferguson's writing is classic on this. So, and then, you know, some kind of resisted it more than others. So there's a kind of spectrum between people between factions among the capitalist class who were like, especially during the war, really, you know, helping run the government factions that were kind of going along with it and factions that were dragging their heels and resisting, you know, the moment of national mobilization, both the new deal.


And then the war once that ends and, you know, a set of kind of compromises has kind of been ha you know, temporary compromise, basically, it's kind of been hashed out, you know, these kind of questions. Are we going to continue the momentum of the war of the new deal after the war, or kind of getting raised, you know, then there is a real campaign to kind of reorganize Capitol the reorganize, the capitalist class politically to, you know, resist any kind of movement toward an American social democracy, which is a real serious threat.


I mean, welfare states are getting constructed, left and right in the spirit. And, you know, that would make sense in the American context given what had happened in the prior 20 years. So, you know, you raised the question of healthcare, which is I think a very good example of this. It, you know, Truman tries to establish what we would today, call Medicare for all. And, you know, particularly in the context of the cold war, you know, encountered tremendous resistance to this. I mean, in general, the national association of manufacturers, the chamber of commerce, these kinds of organizations are campaigning very, very actively politically through throughout the late forties, early fifties against, you know, such extensions of, of the welfare state.


And, you know, also in, in industrial relations itself, I mean, 1950 is famous as the year of the treaty of Detroit, which marks the settling of the second contract between the UAW and GM after the war, when gets settled in 46 and then another, it gets settled and implemented in 50. And in the 50 contract, Daniel Bell bill later became a famous sociologist, famously, says GM paid a billion dollars and they got a bargain. And what he's describing is the basically trading of economic security in the form of these kinds of private privatized fringe benefits, pensions, and healthcare.


And so on trading those for the UAW kind of renouncing its ambitions to participate in the direction of investment and control, you know, control of the process of production. So the kind of United front around the kind of idea of a right to manage, which that represents and, you know, around resistance to, you know, extension of the welfare state further and any kind of universal forms, you know, is I think a fairly significant kind of hegemonic accomplishment for capital in these years.


One way of characterizing this period of, you know, post-war economic growth that kind of get a kind of classic way of thinking about it is that management invests in the, you know, with a view to the longer term, which helps sustain high rates of growth. Exactly because it has, is, has the kind of protections of that have been constructed themselves by the new deal state to kind of guarantee its security and its ability to, you know, operate freely.


So paradoxically the concessions of the new deal state in terms of regulation and, you know, the expanded footprint of the state in terms of infrastructure create an environment where management can actually invest for the longer view is more independent of ownership. This is a big deal in this period of separation of management from shareholders and can take a kind of longer view. I, you know, I think that basically holds up, I mean, in some ways the distinctive thing about capital in this period is that management, as opposed to proprietors are kind of calling the shots and that will be undone in the eighties.


Speaker 1 (28m 29s): And th this period of time clearly has a lot of ramifications for today. And particularly when you're talking about what the new deal and how that, you know, both facilitated some progress at some places, but also like was a repressive force. And others what's interesting to me is that I think I saw I'm a guy get a little bit wrong, but I saw you tweet out a while ago about the curiosity of today's organizers and activists, really going deep and trying to go all out to basically recreate the new deal.


And you pointed out that we tried that and it failed. So why, what, what lessons does the spirit in time teach us about the failures of the new deal as well as the promises and whether or not this is actually something we should be trying to reconstitute today?


Speaker 2 (29m 15s): Yeah. You know, I have to say if it give it such a hard time, I feel like, sorry,


Speaker 3 (29m 19s): I brought it up. I thought it was a good, no, no.


Speaker 2 (29m 21s): It's okay. Well, I lock and unlock my Twitter account periodically. And I said, it wasn't a game. It's like a block to that moment. And it blew up in a way that led to the misunderstanding in part, because historians often use the phrase new deal to mean the liberal political regime from the thirties to the seventies, which is not how normal people use it. Right. Even like historically people that you think about Roosevelt as opposed to a kind of political order, hegemonic political order that lasted for decades. But you know, what I was trying to get at with that, listen to that, I would never deny, as I was saying before, the real gains from millions and millions of working class people, both economic gains, but also, you know, dignity on the job in various ways, power on the job at various ways.


And beyond the job, you know, things like, you know, attempt to construct public housing and, you know, for all that, that got messed up by later policy. And, you know, you can name a million different areas of life where the new deal had a positive, progressive effect. However, first of all, like it felt right. And I think it makes sense when you look back on something that you think was in many ways positive, but which fell under attack. I think, you know, it's incumbent on you, if you're politically serious to do more than just say, well, the bad guys got it.


Right. I mean, that's like, okay, fine. Sure. But you know, why were they able to, that's a question you have to ask, right. And if your ex historical explanation consists of like, sometimes there's bad guys who get us, then you have no way of thinking about how you're going to head off those challenges. Right? How are you going to be prepared for them? Have you given up, oh, like deal with whatever contradictions in your own program make you vulnerable? So, you know, thinking about what was vulnerable about the new deal that opened it to challenge in that way.


You know, I mean, my book argues, and I, I guess I would argue that there's both the kind of, these are related to each other, both the kind of limits of collective bargaining for those who are represented by it. And then there's the, the limits of it in terms of who it represents. Right? And so these both like auto workers don't control the process of production. And also there's the fact that it's harder for African-Americans to begin become auto workers. And if they are, they have the worst jobs, right. There's the fact that, you know, steelworkers like Pete HENAAC are getting sped up and that's making them miserable.


And there's the fact that no women are still workers and, you know, for women to get access to social citizenship and economic security, they have to get married to a steelworker. And, you know, it's very, I mean, I think this is amazing how unknown this is. It's very, very explicit. It's like lots of new deal policymaking that the agenda is to create single breadwinner households. This is like what they're trying to do. They're really clear about it. So then by the seventies and eighties, what are the politics that undo the new deal there?


The politics of white racism, which succeeded in establishing a major constituency among working class people of, you know, kind of revenge kind of polit politicized, patriarchal politics, which, you know, again has a kind of pretty broad social constituency and see what's being contested in the moment. But the new deal order falls is the question of the white single breadwinner family. And whether you can kind of have what it would mean to continue to organize a social order through, or can you continue to organize a social order through a routing economic security through that figure?


I mean, politics of inflation, which are like calamitous in the seventies for liberalism are all about this because some sections of the working class are relatively shielded from inflation by collective bargaining and some are not. And then those are again, are pitted against one another. So, you know, I think like the way we should think about history is not, was it good? Was it bad? Was this a good guy? Was this bad guy? I don't think that's that helpful. I think rather what's more useful is to think about history as a kind of evolving, contradictory process in which like everything that happens is in some way, both bad ed goes like we were talking about with the Wagner act earlier.


And our job is not to kind of reach a final verdict on it, but rather try to position ourselves historically downstream from it, understand how whatever was good and bad about that. Whatever was going on in a given historical episode led to where we are now,


Speaker 1 (33m 49s): One of the good things about the history that you tell. And I go back to pizza, Hanok a lot, not saying that it was a good thing, that he had brought a shotgun, he was going to kill us for a minute, whatever, but the fact that the workers defended him and came to his defense and came to his side and they thought that it was legitimate for him to be that angry and frustrated. I think that really speaks volumes to the differences between then and now, because now, you know, my world is organized labor. I deal with grievances. I kind of feel bad for you reading through all of those grievance archives and documents, cause I'm sure that was tedious and terribly boring work.


But you know, today I hear so much complaints from people that have been kind of in the union world for a long time, for many decades, staffers leaders, you know, elected and so on about the younger generation and how disrespectful they are, both to the company, how much they complain about all the policies on the shop floor, how much they just don't get it. And I'm like, what they're really saying is like, they're just not obedient enough, you know? And they won't often fight over a lot of grievances that summer, maybe legit.


And some we might say are not legit, but the end of the day, the role should be for the union to represent its members and the grievance procedure in this moment in time, not only did they represent this person and not get and like somehow get them off the hook for being fired, the workers came and defended him. And I just think that speaks again, volumes to the difference in what you would call like the common sense today. So that's one of the things that I think is good. And I wonder, like what, what do you think about this? Like how distant we've gotten from that kind of culture of working class solidarity?


I mean, I


Speaker 2 (35m 33s): Think there's something real to that, you know, I guess I think it comes from a couple places, you know, first of all, and I'm sure you've had this experience or recognize what I'm saying in your own organizing life solidarity emerges where workers think that solidarity will be successful, right? You need other conditions too, but it's very, very hard to get people, but for people to stick up for one another in that kind of way, when they don't have much evidence in their own experience and memories of that working never.


And so partly, you know, as the labor movement overall has gotten weaker as workers structural position in the economy has gotten worse over the last 45 years, you know, fewer people have less and less out there, fewer and fewer people have any evidence. And what evidence they do have is less and less over time that it does anything for you. Just stick your neck out for the guy next to you, right. It's just like not an experience as many people have had. So that's one part of it that, that both due to union decline and also to structural features having to do with how much costs you can impose on the company by being disobedient for a moment or a day, or, you know, a week or a month in continuous flow production, you know, in an industrial context, not all workers all the time, but many more workers were positioned economically in such a way that they just obedience immediately started imposing costs on companies.


And that meant that, you know, they had a kind of structural power that made it easier for them to stick together because there was an accumulation of experience of how that can succeed workers in the service industry. You know, it's not, I mean, I, I think it just doesn't work quite in the same way you don't participate, you know, in most many industries, anyway, you're not positioned in relation to production in such a way that if you start sitting on your hands, even for an hour, it's going to create a big problem.


It's just not how it is for a lot of workers. I think that's a key thing. Another thing I would point out though, is that in the thirties and forties, the organization, I mean the organization mass production is at the core of the kind of transformation in the class structure of the country, but workers activity wasn't limited to mass production. And in fact, it was very, very widespread in the culture industries, in journalism, in radio, in Hollywood Disney and music theater. What that meant was that objects of mass culture, you know, the things you heard on the radio or eventually television or the movies that you saw were produced in many, many cases by workers, culture workers, who themselves had experience of class conflict.


And that, that showed up in a variety of ways in the cultural artifacts that they produced and then show dev what else I played for everyone else. This is Michael Denny's argument in the classic book, the cultural front, that for a period of time from the thirties into the forties, and maybe even a little later, there was a kind of working class presence in American popular culture. Like if you think about classic early first-generation sitcoms, like the honeymooners Ralph Camden's character, who's named in a show, I forget is a milk delivery guy.


And then, you know, things like that are common across culture in that period, people working class, people are represented and even unions and labor and strikes are represented quite frequently in one way or another in culture because of the power of the working class and the way that power spilled into the culture industries. So that's again, quite different from today. You just don't have that kind of cultural repertoire to draw on. And I think it makes it harder, but, you know, I think on the other hand workers just like they ever stopped resisting, right? It's a structural component of capitalist production that workers resist in one form or another.


They attempt to develop solidarity one form or another they're more or less successful, you know, depending on a whole host of circumstances I've just been talking about. But, you know, I think our job, if we want workers to resist successfully, as much as possible is to figure out how to take the limits of the situation that I just described and try to figure out, well, what are the, you know, where are the moments of give in that way? What are the weak spots in that, in those kinds of challenges that we face?


Speaker 1 (39m 45s): Well, I want to bring us to a conclusion here and I guess what you're just suggesting about the questions that we should be asking. I want to ask you the question and you, so where do you think today the moments of give are, where do you think working class solidarity can emerge or has been emerging and on how much, because one of the key insights of your book is clearly about the battle over power on the shop for battling against speedups and how the ripple effects of speed ups, you know, cascaded into the house, into life at large, where do you think these moments are today that workers can really fight back?


Speaker 2 (40m 19s): I think there are three kind of categories to think about the possibilities of working class power. Today are three areas of the economy is more how I would put it. You know, one is today's culture industries. So to kind of continue from the answer I was just giving. I think it's hard to dispute that the area of the economy today, where you find the most eagerness to organize and most successful organizing is in relatively kind of more educated and professionalized activities, higher ed tech, to some extent, journalism, certainly non-profits this kind of thing.


You know, I think that's, I mean, that's sort of how I got formed initially as a person involved in the labor movement was in my grad student union. And, you know, that certainly is exciting and something we should celebrate, but there are, well, there are potential kind of cultural spillover effects from that. Maybe comparable to what I was just talking about with, you know, radio in the thirties. I don't know, we could hope so, but you know, the structural power of those workers is not so great, right? Their ability to really impose costs on the capitalist class and therefore struggle with the shape of society in some larger way is not so great.


On the other hand here, we see a lot of structural power potentially with, I think in particular in logistics sector. I mean the organizing efforts at Amazon are an effort to capture this as well as, you know, struggles with like poor truck drivers in LA other warehouse workers around the country. I think we all understand that if those workers really had the kind of organization that their predecessors had in a previous moment, they really could have quite a lot of structural power potentially. You know, that the Amazon warehouse Bessemer costs, you know, a billion and a half to build, I'm making that number up, but it's something like they cost a lot to build.


It was brand new. They weren't likely to just shut it down right away if they, if the workers had one and you know, a ton of value flows, students, workers hands, particularly when you think of the whole sector in the way it's, you know, makes possible global commerce. But that sector is very difficult to organize, right? Very difficult. The workers tend to be very replaceable. Often. Those are the best jobs that anyone is like, they didn't get anytime soon in a given local labor market. So, you know, it's very easy when management implies that you could be replaced tomorrow is very easy for work. No, what that means.


And then the third I would say, and this is what my book is about, is what I think of as the industries of social reproduction in particular healthcare and its associated things like home care and education, maybe childcare, which is sort of associated with education. These are industries where there's not a lot of economic power, necessarily an indirect way. In fact, you know, these industries are very often either public or not-for-profit and where workers legal rights are pretty heavily burdened. In many cases, you know, public employees and a lot of places don't have the right to strike home care.


Workers have a very vexed and weird legal position. And even like hospital and nursing home workers who can typically go on strike and organize and do so. Some, you know, it's not like you didn't really shut down a nursing home or hospital in the way that you can potentially share factory. So there's much of, you know, economic and legal burdens on them. But I have a ton of kind of associational political power. What I mean by that is that those industries hold our society together.


They make us a society in some way. They, you know, we depend on them for basic kind of social functioning and people often, no that understand that we saw this really clearly with the red for ed strike wave. And that potentially gives these workers the ability to kind of form a political Vanguard in some way for a larger working class movement or working class struggle because they embody a kind of larger principle of social solidarity. And when they fight for their own, you know, working conditions and economic conditions, it's possible for them to fight also for a larger group of people.


This is the idea we've come to call bargaining for the common good. I don't think we've really figured out how to do it yet, except, you know, in a couple of cases, but you know, in principle, the interests of teachers or nurses or, you know, home care workers can be made to align with good political work with the, of the kids or the patients or the residents they take care of. And that's a potentially very potent political Alliance, if you can figure out how to organize it. So that's what my book is kind of trying to find the material basis for,


Speaker 1 (44m 44s): Oh, that the book is called the next shift, the fall of industry and the rise of healthcare and rust belt America. I got to say that I love this book a lot. Wait, we really only scratched the surface of what's detailed in it. So folks should check it out, read it. It's easily. One of my favorites of the year. And I really appreciate your time talking to us about it on layaway radio. Thanks for having me. This was great.

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